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Liability of Illiterate Persons upon Written Contrads.

Where accord and satisfaction are embodied in a written instrument,'
which the plaintiff, who can neither read nor write, has signed with his'
mark, and he denies that he ever entered into such a contract, or that
the same was read over to him, and claims that the amount paid him was
not paid him upon such a contract, but upon his claim for wages, and
that in signing he thought he thought he was subscribing to an ordinary
pay roll only, and the circumstances of the signing are suggestive of
misrepresentation, on the part of the agents of the other party to the
alleged contract, although there is no direct testimony to that effect, it
,
is not necessary for him to refund th6 amount received to entitle him to
conpyact.
written
the
him
upon
imposing
in
fraud
of
make the question
into which he did not enter, in lieu of the actual contract under which .
the money was paid to him. (Syllabus by the Court.)

The above case was an action by the appellant Butler
against the. appellee for damages for an injury incurred
while in the employ of the appellee. The defendants
pleaded inter alia payment of $18 in full settlement, and
promised at the 'trial a written contract of settlement'.
signed by the plaintiff with his. mark. The trial judge
charged the jury on this point as follows: "Before the
plaintiff can attack the settlement on the ground of fraud
in its execution he must show first that he tendered back
the consideration, to wit, the $18 received under it, before
the suit was brought, or, at least, that he promptly did so
upon the discovery of the fraud." As there was no evi-

188 Georgia Rep.,

594; 15 S. E. Rep., 668.
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dence of any tender of this sum the jury found for the
.defendant on this point. The charge of the Court was
assigned for error, and the Supreme Court reversed thd
judgment on the ground that the charge was erroneous.
While the only point directly decided was the obligation
to refund the consideration as a pre-requisite to the repudiation of the written paper, the Court in its opinion refers
-to the conflict of authorities upon the effect of a failure to
read written documents before signing, and the case suggests two interesting questions, viz. :
(i) To what extent are illiterate persons liable on
written contracts executed by them in the belief that the
contents are other than they really are?
(2) To what extent is a man liable on a written contract which he has not read, and the contents of which
have been misrepresented to him, or which he has been
induced to sign by some trick in ignorance of its contents?
LIAnuLiTY OF ILLITeRATZ PERSONS UPON WRITTN CONTRACTS.
I. The extent and nature of the
liability of illiterate persons upon
written contracts executed by them
in the belief that the contents are
other than what they really are, is
a question upon' which there has
been no little discussion and difference of opinion. In Thoroughgood's Case, 2 Coke, 9b, the plain.
tiff, who was an illiterate man and
could neithor read nor write, had
a deed tendered to him for execution which he was told was a release for arrears of rent, while in
reality it was a release of all claims.
The deed was not read to him, but
the contents were falsely stated to
him'by some one other than the
grantee. The plaintiff replied to
the statement of the stranger, "If
it be not otherwise, I am content,"
and executed and delivered the
deed. Under these facts the Court
held that the instrument was not
the plaintiff's deed, and it was resolved generally that a deed exe-

cuted by an illiterate person does
-not bind him if read falsely either
by the grantee or a stranger, and
the same was true if the deed was
not read but the contents thereof
were misrepresented. It was further resolved that an illiterate man
was not bound to execute a deed
until it was read to him in a language he could understand, but if
he executed it without requiring it
to be read or explained it was binding, although it might be penned
against his meaning.
In Shulter's Case, 12 Coke, go,
the contents of a document were
falsely declared to a blind man by
the scrivener for the grantees, and
it was held that the blind man was
not bound by an instrument so executed: Manser's Case, 2 Coke, 3a;
Anon. Skin., I59; Sheppards
Touchstone, Sec. s6.
In Cole v. Williams, 12 Neb.,
44o, there was a verbal contract between plaintiff and defendant that
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the latter should do certain work
for the former at a cost not to exceed $ioo. A written order to go
on with the work was afterwards
presented to the plaintiff for his
signature. .He was unable to read
without spectacles, lnd did not
have them with him at the time.
The defendant's agent therefore
read the paper to him, omitting
the price, which was greater than
in the verbal contract. It was held
that he was not guilty of such negligence'as 'would entitle the defendant to use the full amount of
the written contract by way of set-
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contract of agency, and was read
to him as such. The Supreme
Court laid down the principle that
"a party whose signature to a
paper is obtained by fraud as tothe character of the paper itself,
who is ignorant of such character,
and who has no intention of signing it, and who is guilty of no
negligence in affixing his signaturethereto, or in not ascertaining the
character of the instrument, is no
more bound by it than if it were a.
total forgery of the signature," and
sustained a verdict for the defendant, although the plaintiff was a
bonafide holder for value without
off:
In Schuylkill Co. v. Copley, 67
notice, who took the note in thePa. St., 390, the Court held, fol- ordinary course of business beforelowing Thoroughgood's Case, that
maturity.
a bond signed by an illiterate obliWalker v. Ebert, 29 Wis., 194,
gor under a misrepresentation .of where the maker was a foreigner-.its contents, .even if by a stranger,
who could not understand English,
is not his deed, and maybe avoided
is to the same effect: Sims v. Bice,.
under a plea of non e;t actum:
67 Ill., 88.'
Stoever v. Weir, io S. & R. (Pa.),
It will be noted that in all the
25.
foregoing cases there was some acThis question of the liability of tive misrepresentation -which inilliterate persons on writings exeduced the illiterate person to signcuted under mistake has arisen
the contract, .and the better view
frequently in suits on negotiable
is that- a man whether literate or
paper so executed. This question
illiterate who signs a document
will be considered at length under
without inquiring its contents is
II (post), but it is appropriate to
bound by his signature: Thoroughconsider one or two of the cases in good's Case, su_-a; Hallenbeck v.
this 6onnection, as illustrating
Dewitt, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 404;
more fully the principle - of law Bauer v. Roth, 4 Rawle (Pa.), 83;
enunciated in the principal case
Weller's App., 1O3 Pa. St., 594;
supra.
Roach v. Carr, 18 Kan., 53o; Rob*Thus in Webb v. Corbin, 78 Ind., inson v. Glass, 94 Ind., 211; Wald's
403, suit was brought on a promisPollock on Contracts, p. 413, note.
sory note by an endorsee against
(2) and authorities there cited; but
in some of the States the courts so.
the maker. It was proved that the
far favor the illiterate 'as to hold
latter Nas an old man whose eyesight was much impaired by dis- that the onus of proving that he
ease and age, who had no glasses, understands any writing that he
and who could not read without
executes is cast upon the otherthem. The note was falsely repre- party': Suffern v. Butler, 3 C. E.
sented to him by the payee to be a
Green, 220.
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In Trainbly v,.Ridard, 13o Mass.,
259, a party to an oral agreement
who was unable to read or write
affixed his mark to a paper without its contents being read or explained to him. He supposed that
it contained the terms of the oral
agreement, but did not ask to have
it explained or read. It was held
that evidence was admissible to
how that the terms of the written
contract differed from those orally
agreeAl upon, and that a finding
that the writing was fraudulently
"obtained would be justified, CoLT,
J., saying: "Upon the question
whether in this case there was evidence of fraud, which should have
been submitted to the jury, the
fact that the plaintiff was an unlettered person, who could not
read nor. write, is of controlling
importance. In Selden v. Meyers,
TANzy, C. J., laid down the principle that a person dealingwith an
illiterate man who could neither
read nor write, and taking from
him a promissory note for the payment of money and a deed of trust
to secure the payment, was bound
to show that he fully understood
the object and import of the writings sought to be enforced against
him: May's Ex'rs v. Seymour, 17
Fla., 725.
In O'Neil v. Lake Superior Iron
Co., 63 Mich., 690, an iron company organized a "benefit club,"
the plan of which was printed in
large posters, which were posted
in conspicuous- places about the
mines. One of the conditions of
membership was that the employees and employers were each to
subscribe a certain amount" each
week to the club, and in case aniy
employee was injured or killed a
certain sum was to be paid to him
or his personal representatives

upon the execution of a release of
all claims against the company for
damages for injuries, whether occasioned by the negligence of the
company or otherwise. The plaintiff, a member of the club, was injured, and signed such release.
He could not read nor write, and
had no knowledge of the terms
and conditions of the printed
notice, or the contents of the release, which he believed to be a
simple receipt. The agents of the
company, when the money was
paid to him, handed him the paper,
and said: "Sign this receipt." It
was held by the Court above that
the judge should have submitted
to the jury the question whether
the plaintiff was misled into signing, or whether he understood the
contents, and the fact that the
money received from the club was
not tendered before suit was immaterial because the right to it existed
independent of the claim in suit.
See also Wright v. McPike, 70
M o., 179, where a similar rule was
laid down, although the Supreme
Court, in affirming the charge of
the judge in the Court below, noted
the fact that the jury had found as
a fact that the contents of the bond
had been misread or misconstrued
to the plaintiff.
On the other hand, the California courts have gone to the
other extreine.
In Hawkins v.
Hawkins, 5o Cal., 558, at action
was brought for the price of certain
wheat sold to the defendant.' The
plaintiff in his statement prayed
that a certain written contract executed by him to the defendant be
declared void, and set out in the
statement triat he was illiterate and
did not ask to have the contents of
the writing which he signed read to
him because two of the defendants

UPON WRITTEN CONTRACNS.
told him that it was like the verbal
agreement they had made, although they knew that these statements were false, and made them
for the purpose of deceiving him.
On demurrer,.the Court sustained
the demurrer on the ground that
the statement set out no cause of
action, saying that the plaintiff
should Jiave either examined the
document himself or had it examined by some one in whom he had
confidence.
Notwithistatiding this conflict in
the cases, the weight of authority
seems to be in support of the law
as laid down in Thoroughgood's
Case, sut!fra (to wit, that a written
contract executed by a man who
can neither read nor write under
the belief that it is something other
than it really is, is 'oid and cannot
be enforced by the other party to
the contract, where such belief is
induced by the false statemefits of
such other party), and the decision
in the principal case is in consonance with this view.
In the principal case the error
into which the court below was
led was in considering the case as
one of fraud simply, and the charge
of the Court therein shows how an
inaccurate use of this word fraud
may lead to confusion and error.
The effect of fraud upon a contract is to render it voidable, and
if this were a case of fraud alope
the trial judge would have been
correct in his charge that there
must be a tender of the consideration before the contract could be
attacked. That is, a man who attacks a contract to which he is a
party on the ground of fraud admits the existence of the contract,
but asserts that he was induced to
enter into it under a false statement
of facts by the other party, and the

law requires that he shall put the
other party in stahe quo by returning any consideration he may have
received thereunder before he can
attack its validity. But the position of the plaintiff in the principal case is not simply that of a
man induced by falsehood to execute an instrument the contents of
which he knows, but of one who
was mistaken in the very nature of
the instrument he signed; and
whose mind never accompanied
the stroke of his pen. It is true
that in nearly every case of mistake, the mistake is induced by
fraudulent representations, but its
effect upon the contract is to render it absolutely void because the
minds ofthe parties to the writing
never met, and the written words
do not represent any contract at'
all. This is well illustrated in the case of Green v. North Buffalo
Township, 56 Pa. St., lio, AGNxw,
J., saying: "The argument of the
plaintiff in error overlooks the
palpable distinction between a defence resting upon facts which are
misstated in order to induceaparty
to enter into a bond, the contents
of which he knows, and one resting upon a nrisrepresentation of the
contents of the instrument itself to
an illiterate person. In the former
case the bond is the obligation of
the party who seals it, but it is
avoided by the false inducement to
enter into it, and in the latter the
instrument is not his deed or bond
at all."
Therefore the lower court was
in error in holding that the consideration must be tendereil before
the written contract could be attacked, because the money so received by the plaintiff was not
received as the consideration of
the execution of the contract in

-
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suit, but as that of an entirely distinct contract,' which was not inconsistent with the enforcement of
the one in suit: O'Neil v. Lake
Superior Iron Co., 63 Mich., 69o.
IT. A question closely akin to that
raised in the principal case, which
may properly be considered in this
connection, is as to the extent of
the liability of a man of intelligence, who can read and write, on
a written contract, executed by
him without reading, in reliance
on the false representations of the
other party, or which he has been
induced to sign by some trick in
ignorance of its contents.
When this question is raised between the original parties to the
contract, the authorities lay down
the same rule as that in the principal case; but when the rights of
inuocent third parties are concerned, as in the case of negotiable
paper, which has come into the
hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice,.different considerations are involved which will
be considered later.
Thus, in an early case, it was
said: " If I desire a man to enfeoff
me of an acre of land in Dale, and
he tell me to make a deed for one
acre with letter of attorney, and I
make the deed for two acres,/and
read and declare the deed to him
as for only one acre, and he seal
the deed, this deed is utterly void,
whether the feoffor be lettered or
not, because he gave credence to
me and I deceived him:" Keilw.,
70 b. pl. 6; Hirshfield v. L. B. &
S. C. Rwy. Co., 2 Q. B. D., I;
Simons v. Great Western Rwy.
Co., 2 C. B. N. S., 619.
So, in Edwards v. Brown, i Cr.
and Jer., 307, BAYrEY, J., recognizes the rule that where the contents of a deed are misrepresented

to the party executing it, the deed
is void, and this defence can be
proved under the plea of non est
factum, while the defence of fraud
can never be offered under the general issue.
The same principle applies to all
classes of contracts, and where the
question arises between the original
parties, a contract of this kind is
held void in toto: The Consols Ins.
Assn- v. Newall, 3 F. & F., 130;
Jones v. Austin, 17 Ark., 498; Laidlaw v. Loveless, 40 Ind., 211; Davis
v. Snider, 7o Ala., 315; Resh v.
Bank, 93 Pa. St., 397; Stacy v.
Ross, 27 Texas, 3; VanValkenburg
v. Rank, 12 Johnson, 337.
When, however, the question
arises between the party who has
been tricked by the false statement
to sign a contract he never intended to, and an innocent third
party, who has acquired rights under such contract by assignment,
or who has altered his position on
the faith of the existence of such
contract, other considerations arise
which have given rise to great
diversity of opinion in the courts
of our various States.
In England the courts have gone
so far as to say that where a man
executes a deed in blank, with instructions as to how the blanks are
to-be filled up, and the deed is
fraudulently filled up, that this
will not estopp the party so executing from denying that it is his
deed, and the doctrine that an instrunent signed in blank binds
the signer in the hands of third
parties, who are bona fide purchasers for value without notice,
no matter how the blanks are filled
up, is confined to negotiable paper:
Swan v. North British Australasian
Co., 7 H. & N., 603; 2 H. & C.,
175; Taylor v. Rwy. Co., 6 DeG. &
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J., 559; Halifax Union v. Wheelwright, L. R., ro Ex., 192; Ex
piareSwan 7 C. B. N. S., 44o.
In Vorley v. Cook, r Giff., 250,
a bill was filed to foreclose a mortgage, and a -cross bill by the defendant praying that the mortgage
be delivered up to be cancelled.
The alleged mortgagor had executed the mortgage to his solicitor
under the false representation that
it was a deed of covenant to produce title deeds. , The solicitor assigned the mortgage so procured
to a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice. It was, nevertheless, held that the mortgage deed
was absolutely void, and should be
delivered up to be cancelled. See
also Ogilvie v. Jeaffreson, 2 Giff.,
353; Kennedy v. Green, 3 M. & K.,
699.
But in the -later case of Hunter
v. Walters, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap. 75, the
three last cases are severely criticized, although not distinctly overruled, as the decision was based on
the ground that tfiere was no sufficient evidence of misrepresentation, but MELLISH, I,. J., says:
"In my opinion i4 is still a doubtful question of law on which I
do not wish to give any decisive
opinion, whether if there be a false
representation respecting the contents of a deed, a person who is an
educated person, and who might,
by very simple means, have satisfied himself as to what the contents
of the deed really were, may not,
by executing it, negligently be
estopped as between himself and a
person who innocently acts upon
the faith of the deed being valid
and who accepts an estate under
it."
But the most ordinary form in
which this question arises, is in
suits on negotiable paper, and it is

in these cases that the greatest confusion exists. Indeed, it may be
safely said, that there is no other
branch of the law in which there
are so many cases practically identical as to the facts where the conclusions reached by the courts are
so varying. Throughout the Western States there seems to have
been a systematic plan adopted by
the agents of patented farm im7
plements and kindred articles of
tricking the unsophisticated farmers into, signing promissory notes
under the false statement that they
were only executing contracts of
agency, and then selling the notes
so executed so that they would pass
into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice;
so that case after case may be.
found in the reports which differfrom one another in name only,
but in which the conclusions.
reached by the courts differ materi-

ally.
In Foster v. -Mackinnon, L. R.'
4 C. P., 704, one of the most carefully considered cases on this subject, the facts were 'as follows:
The plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
and before maturity of a bill of exchange on 'which the defendant
was an endorser. The defendant
was induced to put his name on
the back of this bill by fraudulent
representation on the part of the
acceptor of the bill that the instrument was only a guaranty, and
proved this fact at the trial by the
acceptor himself. The defendant
did not see the face of the bill at
all, but it was of the usual shape
and bore a bill stamp, the impress
of which was visible at the back of
the bill. The trial judge, BovrL,
C. J., instructed the jury that if the
defendant's signature to the docu.
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ment was obtained by fraudulent
representation that it was a guarantee, and the defendant signed it
without knowing that it was a bill,
* and under the belief that it was a
guarantee, and if he was not guilty
of any negligence in so signing the
paper, he was entitled to the verdict. On motion for new trial the
Court in bane affirmed the charge
of the trial judge, ByrLzs, J., holding that a signature so obtained
was of no force, not merely on the
ground of fraud, where fraud existed, but because the mind of the
signer never accompanied his signature; that is, that he never intended to sign, and, therefore, in
contemplation of law, never did
sign the contract to which his
name was appended; but the rule
* was made absolute on the other
ground that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence on the
question of negligence.
Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass., 45,
recognizes the same principle as
that laid down in the last case.
In Missouri a number of cases of
this kind -have arisen where a
bona fide holder, for value without
notice and before maturity, has
sued the maker of negotiable
paper, who has been induced to
sign such paper by the false statements of the payee or his agent as
to its nature; and in Briggs v.
Ewart, 51 Mo., 245, and Martin v.
Snyder, 55 Mo., 577, the Court follow the rule laid down in Foster v.
Mackinnon, which makes the defendant's negligence the test of his
liability.
In .Shirts v. Overjohn, 6o Mo.,
305, the Court went a step further
and laid down the rule as follows:
"Where it appears that the party
sought to be charged intended to
bind himself by some obligation in

writing, and voluntarily signed his
name to what he supposed to be
the obligation he intended to execute, having full and unrestricted
means of ascertaining for himself
the true character of such instrument before signing the same, but
by his failure to inform himself of
its contents, or by relyihg upon the
,representationsof another as to the
contents of the instrument presented for his signature, signed and
delivered a negotiable note in lieu
of the instrument intended to be
signed, he cannot be heard to impeach its validity in the hands of a
bonafide holder."
In Frederick v. Clemens, 6o Mo.,
3x3, the rule laid down in the last
case, though formally adopted,,
seems to be departed from, but it
must be noted that the defendant
in this latter case c6uld neither
read nor write.
In Wisconsin the decisions lean
rather in favor, of the defrauded
maker and against the holder.
Thus, in Griffiths v. Kellog, 39Wis.,
390, the defendant, a wolnan, signed
the no'e in suit upon the false representation of the payee that it was
a different note for a smaller sum.
She could not read the note because
her glasses were at a neighbor's •
house, but two of her children were
present at the time who could have
read it had she asked them to. The
plaintiff was a bona fide holder for
value without notice. A' verdict
for the defendant was sustained in
the upper court, the Court holding
that the question of negligence was
properly submitted to the jury;
See also Kellog v. Steiner, 29 Wis.,
626; Butler v'. Carns, 37 Wis., 6i;
Chapman v. Tucker, 38 Wis., 43;
Roberts v. McGrath, 38 Wis., 52;
Roberts v. Wood, 38 Wis., 6o;
Roberts v. Thomas, 62 Wis. 484.
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In Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis., 194,
DIXoN, C. J., discusses this question at length, and advances a
strong argument in favor of the
view that as the mind of the maker
did not accoinpany his act that act
is void, no matter into whose hands
the instrument passes. "The inquiry in such cases," says the judge,
"goes back of all questions of negotiability

.

.

.

it challenges

the origin or existence of the paper
itself. .... It is immaterial that
the supposed instrument is negotiable in form or that it may have
passed to the hands of a bona fide
holder for value. Negotiability in
such a case presupposes the existence of the instrument as having
been made by the party whose
name is subscribed, for until it has
been so made and has such actual
legal existence it is absurd to talk
about negotiation or transfer or
bona fide holder of it within the
law. That which in contemplation
of law never existed as a negotiable
instrument cannot be held to be
such, and to say that it is and has
the qualities of negotiability because it assumes the form of that
kind of paper, and thus to shut out
all inquiry as to its existence, or
whether it is really and truly what
it purports to be, is petitio principii - begging the question altogether.
In Nebraska it has been held that
a person who signs negotiable
paper without any negligence in
the belief that it is a contract of
another kind, is protected .even as
against a bonafide holder for value
without notice who buys before
maturity, and to rely on the reading of the instrument bX the other
party thereto does not necessarily
constitute negligence: Nat. Bank
v. Lierman, 5 Neb., 247; Palmer v.

Largent, 5 Neb., 223; Griffin v.
Short, 14 Neb., 259.
In Dinsmore v. Stimbert, 12 Neb.,
433, the plaintiff was a bona fide
holder for value without notice, and
the defence of the alleged maker
was the same as in the preceding
cases. The.trial judge instructed
the jury "if you find that the defendant before signing the note
used the diligence and care that a
man of ordinary prudence would
have used under similar circumstances to ascertain its contents,
and was without fault, you must
The
find for the defendant."
Snpreme Court held, reversing the
decision in the court below, that
the jury should have been in-,
structed (as in the case of Foster v.
Mackinnon) that to make such a
defence available the defendant
must show that he was not guilty
of any neglect in signing the
paper.
In Indiana the decisions seem to
have wavered from one view to theother. Thus, in Cline v. Guthrie,
42

Ind.,

227,

the maker of a nego-

tiable note was induced by the
payee to sign it on the rdpresentation that it was a blank piece of
paper and that he desired to seehow the maker spelt his name.
The maker discovered the fraud
after execution, tut the payee took
the note and escaped. It was held
that the maker was no more bound
to a bona fide purchaser of the
note than if it were a total forgery,
not only because of mistake, but
because of non-delivery.
In Nebeker v. Custinger, 48 Ind.,
436, the rule was laid down that
where a man who can without difficulty read, executes a negotiable
promissory note without reading it
and trusting to the party to whom
it is executed for a statement of its
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contents, he is guilty of such negligence as will estop him from setting up the defence of mistake
against a bona fide holder thereof:
.Maxwell v. Morehart, 66 Ind., 3o.
In Ruddell v. Dillman, 73 Ind.,
518,, the Court said the principle
laid down in Nebeker z. Custinger,
sufira, was equally applicable
whether the maker could read or
not: Baldwin v. Barrows, 86 Ind.,
351; Yeagley v. Webb, 86 Ind., 424;
but in Webb v. Corbin, 78 Ind.,
403, where the alleged maker was
an old man, sick and feeble and
finable to read and with no one to
whom he could appeal to read the
note to him, and the payee induced1
-him to sign by a false reading
thereof, the Court, on demurrer to
the defendant's plea, held that as a
matter of law the defendant was
not guilty of any negligence, and
not liable to the plaintiff, who was
a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice: Mitchell v. Tomlinsin, 91 Ind., 168.
In Michigan, as in Wisconsin,
the courts lean far toward protecting the maker, on the grounds indicated by DIXON, J., in Walker v.
Ebert supra).
Thus, in Gibbs v. Linabury, 22
Mich., 479, the maker of a negotiable note, whose eyesight was weak,
was induced by agents of payees to
.sign a number of papers overlying
one another on the representation
that they were duplicates of a contract of agency. The court below
directed a verdict for the plaintiff,
who was a bona fide holder, but
the Supreme Court reversed, and,
while they found that there was no
negligence, they based their decision on the broad ground that as
the defendant did not intend to
make negotiable paper he was not
bound.

Anderson v. Walter, 34 Mich.,
113, lays down a rule directly op-

posite to that laid down in Shirts
v. Overjohn, 6o Mo., 3o5 and Nebeker v. Custinger, 48 Ind., 436
(sufi-a); Soper v. Peck,.5I Mich.,
563.The leading case in New York
on this subject is Chapman v. Rose,
56 N. Y., 137, where the plaintiff,
a bonafide holder for value without
notice, sued the maker of a promissory note, and the judge charged
the jury that if the paper sued
upon was never delivered by the
defendant as a note the plaintiff
must fail in his action. On appeal
JOHNSON, J., in reversing the court
below on the ground of misdirection, says: "The evidence tends
to show that the signature of the
defendant was obtained by a very
gross and fraudulent representation
perpetrated on him by Miller, the
payee (as to the nature of the instrument). . . . There was no
physical obstacle to the defendant's
reading the paper; the defendant
had the power to know with certainty the exact obligation he was
assuming and chose to trust to the
integrity of the person with whom
he was dealing instead of exercising his own power to protect himself. . . . The charge of the
judge excluded the consideration
of negligefice." . . . After examniing a number of the cases,
including Foster v. Mackinnon,
the judge concludes: "In all these
cases the real ground of decision is
.not that the party meant to make
a promissory note, but that meaning to make an obligation in writing, and which was put in writing
that it might of itself import both
the fact and the form and measure
of the obligation, he trusted another to fix that form and measure
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without exercising that supervision
that was in his power and by which
perfect protection was possible. In
such cases the rule is that he is
bound by the act of him who has
been trusted; in favor of a holder
in good faith:" Whitney v. Snyder,
2 Lansing (N. Y.), 477.
In Pennsylvania the rule is carried even further to pr6tect the
bona fide holder. Thus, in State
Bank v. Schreck, i Legal Chr., 65,
overruling without noticing Mercur
v. Schwankie, 4 Leg Gai., 99, the
defendant offered to prove in a suit
by a bona*fide holder of a promissory note that he had executed the
note on the fraudulent representation of the payee, who asserted
that it was an agreement constituting him agent for the sale of patent
hay forks. The lower court rejected
the offer and the Supreme Court
affirmed this view. So, in Broad-

bent v. Huddlestone,

2

W. N. C.,

293, it was held that the fact that
the payee had slipped one paper
under another and thus made the
defendant sign what be never intended to was no defence as against
a bona fide holder. See also McSparran v. Neeley, 91 Pa. St., 17.
In Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me., 194, a
case similar to- those above, the
lower court was reversed for not
leaving the question of the defendant's negligence to the jury, as the
test of his liability, and in Kellogg
v. Curtis, 65 Me., 59, the rule laid
down in lissouri and New York
as to the liability of a man who
signs a promissory note relying
solely on the representations of the
other party that it is an instrument
of another nature, when that note
passes into the hands of a bona
fide purchaser for value, is affirmed
by PETERS, J., as follows: ' We by
no means mean to be understood as

saying that a person may be holden
in every case where his signature
to a note has been surreptitiously
obtained. . . . But the ddfendant signed a paper which he knew
was to be effedtual for some purpose by means of his name thereto
and he was in fault for entrusting
it with an adversely interested
party without knowing what it
was."
The law in Iowa in this case is
well illustrated in two cases decided
the same day. In the former,
Caulkins v. Whistler, 29 Iowa, 495,
the defendant wrote his name on a
blank piece of paper which the one
obtaining it asserted was to be used
in identifying his signature. A
promissory note having been written in over this signature, and the
note negotiated to an innocent
holder for value, it 'was held that
the instrument was a forgery and
the defendant was not liable thereon. In the latter case of Douglass
v. Matting, 29 Iowa, 498, the defendant executed a promissory
note, relying on the payee as to its
contents, and it was held that he'
could not defend as against a bona
fide holder, on the ground that the
representations of the payee were
false: Bank v. Steffes, 54 Iowa, 214;
Hopkins v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 57
Iowa, 203.
In Illinois the negligence is held
to be the test of the defendant's
liability, and relying on the representations of the payee as to the
contents of the paper executed will
not, as a matter of law, constitute
negligence. Thus, in. Taylor v.
Atchison, 54 Ill., 196, the defendant, who could read without difficulty, was induced by the agents
of the piyee to execute a note
which they read to him (at his
vequast) as a contract of agency
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Suit havifig been brought by a
bonafide holder of this note, a verdict for the defendant was sustained
on the ground that the defendant
used reasonable caution: Leach v.
Nichols, 55 Ill., 273; Puffer v.
Smith, 57 Ill-, 527; Vanbrunt v.
Singley, 85 Ill., 281; Sims v. Bice,
67 Ill., 88; Auten v. Gruner, go IlL,
In the case of De Camp v.
Hamma, 29 Ohio, 467, the maker
of a promissory note was induced
-to execute it by the fraudulent representations of the payee that it
was a contract of agency; suit
having been brought on the note
by a bona fide holder, the question
of negligence was left to the jury,
and they having found that there
was no negligence, a verdict for the
defendant was 'sustained by the
Supreme Court, MCILvAIx, J.,
.using the following rather remarkable reasoning: "It does not appear, however, in the case before
us, that Hamma was a person possessing the ordinary faculties and
knowledge, it being simply found
in the special verdict that he was
not guilty of any negligence or
want of ordixiary care; but in order
that we may not be misunderstood
in relation to the amount of care
requisite in such cases, it is well to
add that there can be no doubt that
a person possessing the ordinary
faculties, and being able to read
and write, who relies solely upon
the representations of the other
contracting parties as to the character of the instrument, should be
regarded as negligent as against an
innocent endorsee for value." It
would seem from this opinion 1hat
a citizen of Ohio is not presumed
to liossess ordinary common sense,
but that the fact that he does must
be proved affirmatively!

In New Hampshire, in the case
of Bank v. Smith, 55 N. H., 593,
the defendant, who was an old man
of limited education and poor eyesight, and who was unaccustomed to
write anything but his own name,
was induced by the fraudulent representations of the payee to sign a
negotiable promissory note on the
assertion that it was a contract of
agency merely. The defendant's
daughter, an intelligent woman,
was present at the time and could
have read the paper if appealed to.
Held by a referee that the defendant was estopped by his own negli.gence from setting up these facts
as against a bona fide holder of the
note. And the Supreme Court sustained this view. '
- In Bank v. Johnson, 22 W. Va.,
520, one of the latest cases od this
subject in which all the authorities
are carefully reviewed, JoHxsoN,
P.J., says: "A bona fide holder of
negotiable paper has, a valid title,
and can recover against a maker
unless at the time he purchased
the note it was absolutely void,
although the maker was induced to
sign such note by 'fraud, not intending to sign such a note, but
a paper of an entirely different
character. And in such a case the
question of negligence in the
m aler forms no legitimate subject
of inquiry. . . . When one of
two innocent parties must suffer
by the act of a third, he rho by
his act has enabled such third person to cause the loss must sustain
it." In Mackey v. Peterson, 29
Minn.,.
298, the defendant was a foreigner
who could not read English, nor
was there any one within a half
mile who could. Having, under
these circumstances, executed a
negotiable promissory note, on the
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fraudulent representation of the
payee that it was a receipt, it was
held that he could not defend on
this ground as against a bona fide
holder for value.
In Ort v. Fowler, 31 Kan., 478, a
still later case, the same principle
is laid down, BRBWER, 3., in an
elaborate and able opinion affirming the charge of the trial judge as
follows: "If the note was procured
from the defendant without any
negligence on his part, by fraud
and trickery, and without any consideration, the plaintiff cannot recover; but the mere relying uvfon
the readingand word of a stranger,
if such was the fact, would be evidence of such negligenceon the piart
of defendant as would make him
liablefor the amount of the nale in
the hands of an innocent holderfor
value."
To reconcile these conflicting
authorities is out of the question,
but it is submitted that the true rule,
and that which is considered in the
most carefully considered cases, is
embodied in the two following
propositions:

(i) Where a man, whether he can
read and write or not, intends to
execute a written instrument of
some kind, and, relying on the
representations of the other party
to the instrument as to its character, executes a negotiable promissory note in lieu of the instrument
he intends to execute, he will be
estopped by his own negligence
from impeaching the validity of
such note in' the hands of a bona
fide holder for value, and the judge
should so instruct the jury.
(2) Where a man intends to execute a written instrument of some
kind, and by some trick or shifting
of papers on the part of the other
party a negotiabl% note is substituted for the instrument intended
to be executed, then the test of the
defendant's liabiltity to a bbna fide
holder for value is whether he has
been guilty of any negligence -in
executing the instrument or not,
and the question should be left to
the jury to pass upon.
CHAS. C. TOWNsEND.

